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Philoponus’s Traversal Argument and the 
Beginning of Time
George Couvalis
Richard Sorabji has argued that John Philoponus’ arguments for the claim that time 
must have had a beginning are good ad hominem arguments against Aristotle. However, 
he claims that they do not show that time must have had a beginning. I argue that one 
of those arguments, the traversal argument, is unaffected by Sorabji’s major criticisms. 
Sorabji fails to take account of the fact that the argument is not merely based on logical 
considerations, but on a theory of time.
Introduction
The sixth century Alexandrian Christian philosopher John Philoponus is known only 
to specialists. Yet research has shown that he is a very important figure in the history 
of science and philosophy. In particular, it has been shown that his critique of many 
of Aristotle’s scientific claims was important in the development of physics. Richard 
Sorabji and Herbert Davidson have recently argued that another of Philoponus’s 
intellectual contributions was very influential, his arguments against Aristotle’s view 
that the world is everlasting (Davidson, 1987; Sorabji, 1983:210–224; Sorabji, 2010a, 
2010b). 
Sorabji says that Philoponus’ arguments against the eternity of the world were so 
subtle that it took eight hundred years before thinkers managed to plausibly criticise 
them. On his account, discussion of them led to important developments in the under-
standing of infinity and in expanding the range of options available in cosmogony.1 
However, he also argues that until recently no one grasped Philoponus’ originality as 
they were mistakenly attributed to the thirteenth century western thinker Bonaven-
ture. In fact, he shows Bonaventure was only repeating Philoponus’ arguments and 
examples.
1 Sorabji says that recent research shows that Archimides and an Arab writer of the tenth century had the 
mathematical resources to criticise the arguments. However, no one used those resources to criticise 
the arguments until the fourteenth century (Sorabji, 2010:24–25).
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To understand Philoponus’ intellectual contribution, we need to grasp that, as 
far as we can tell, amongst pagan philosophers no one defended the view that the 
universe and time began. Those who believed in divine designers or makers, such as 
Plato in the Timaeus, believed that the universe and time had always existed. However, 
they thought that the designer or maker had brought into existence ordered time 
and imposed a law like order on matter. Nearly all Pagan philosophers believed that 
the statement that nothing can come from nothing is obviously true. Neo-Platonists 
thought that the world was everlasting, but that the divine was a “creator” only in the 
sense that without the divine, the order, and perhaps the matter, in the world would 
cease to exist. Some Jews and Christians agreed with the Neo-Platonists on this point. 
By contrast, other Jews and Christians thought that God had brought the universe and 
time into existence. Before Philoponus, Christian thinkers had sometimes responded 
to criticisms of the claim that the universe and time began. They had argued that there 
was no good reason for the claim that the universe and time are everlasting. However, 
Philoponus seems to have been the first person to argue in detail that the universe 
and time must have begun (Sorabji, 1983; Gregory, 1997). 
Despite the historical importance of Philoponus, Sorabji argues that his arguments do 
not show that time must have had a beginning; they only work as arguments against 
someone who accepts Aristotle’s assumptions about infinity. While Sorabji deserves 
great praise for bringing these neglected arguments to light, I will argue that he under-
estimates one argument, the traversal argument.
Background to the Traversal Argument
Before I begin my detailed exposition of the traversal argument, I will start with some 
remarks about types of arguments. We need to understand the type of argument 
Philoponus is presenting to see whether Sorabji’s criticisms are adequate.
There are at least two types of arguments:
 1) An argument in which we take the position we want to criticise and show that 
the position leads to inconsistencies or some other absurdity. Someone want-
ing to show that the universe cannot have an infinite past would assume that it 
did have an infinite past, and try to show that inconsistencies follow. Perhaps 
Philoponus’ infinity arguments are of this type. We will see that Philoponus’ 
traversal argument is not of this type.
 2) An argument which takes as a premise a view different to the position criticised, 
and argues on the basis of it that the view criticised can’t be true. We will see 
that Philoponus’ traversal argument is of this type. He argues on the basis of 
assumptions which he takes to be true about the nature of time that an infinite 
past is impossible. 
It is reasonable to bar arguments that are criticisms of a position that is different 
from the one in question. Suppose an argument of type 1 is produced which uses a 
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different premise from the position in question. It is legitimate to respond to that 
argument by pointing out that the premise is not the assumption of the position 
criticised. For instance, if the position criticised is that past time is infinite, it is not 
correct to assume in the criticism that past time is infinite but also began. It would 
be legitimate to respond to the criticism by pointing out that the assumption of the 
position criticised is that time had no beginning. However, if an argument is of the 
second type, it is question-begging to respond to criticism by pointing out that the 
position criticised holds that time had no beginning, for that is the very question 
being debated.
We will see that this is important in discussing Sorabji’s criticisms, for Sorabji 
writes as if Philoponus is producing the first type of argument when he is producing 
the second type of argument.
The Traversal Argument
The traversal argument occurs in Philoponus’ commentary on Aristotle’s Physics. He 
notes there that Aristotle holds that the universe and time are everlasting but also 
argues that actual infinities are impossible. He wants to agree with Aristotle that actual 
infinities are impossible though he wants to argue that one cannot coherently hold 
that the universe and time are everlasting. Part of his reason is that an infinite past 
time is really a kind of actual infinity. This is why he repeats Aristotle’s arguments 
against actual infinities and adds further arguments of his own. However, he is aware 
that Aristotle seems to argue in response to such arguments that an infinite past time 
is not an actual infinity because the past has ceased to exist. Criticising Aristotle’s 
response, he comments
...I say that existence is possible for the numerically unlimited (apeiron) rather as pres-
ently existing than as past, for what presently exists need not be completely traversable 
(diexititon), but what is past is necessarily traversable — which is impossible. (Vitelli, 
1887:430; Edwards, 1994:96–7) 
Philoponus’ claim here is that, contrary to Aristotle, an infinite past time is not less, 
but more problematic than a presently existing spatial infinity — even if we thought 
that a presently existing infinity were possible, an infinite past time is impossible. The 
reason he gives is that the path through the past to the present is necessarily travers-
able whereas the path through a presently existing infinity need not be traversable. 
What he means by “traversable” is unclear here.
In his Against Proclus he puts a clearer version of the traversal argument: 
For the very same reason (aitia) that the infinite (apeiron) cannot exist all at once and 
at the same time it cannot emerge into actuality by existing a bit at a time. For if it were 
at all possible for the infinite to have emerged into actuality by existing a bit at a time, 
what further reason (logos) could there be to prevent it from also existing in actuality all 
at once? For it would seem much more impossible to claim that the infinite is brought to 
actual birth bit by bit and, as it were, to be counted out one unit (monas) after another 
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than that it exists all at once and at the same time. For if it exists all at once, perhaps there 
will be no need to go through it unit by unit, and actually, as it were, count it off; but if it 
comes to be a bit at a time and one unit always exists after another, so that eventually an 
actually infinite number of units has come to exist, even if it does not exist all at once at 
the same time because parts of it have ceased to exist while parts [still] exist, it has nev-
ertheless become traversable, which is impossible. [But] this — I mean the traversing of 
the infinite by, as it were, counting it off unit by unit — is impossible, even if the counter 
were everlasting. For the infinite is by its nature untraversable; otherwise it would not be 
infinite. (Rabe, 1899:10; Philoponus, 2005:24)2
Someone focussing on the first two sentences of this passage might think that 
Philoponus intends the traversal argument to be simply a restatement of his argu-
ments about infinity as such plus the claim that a past infinity is an actual infinity 
that has come into being a bit at a time. However, the sentence which starts the 
traversal argument begins with “[F]or it would seem much more impossible...”. This 
suggests that Philoponus thinks that there is an extra impossibility in traversing an 
infinite past. It implies that we could reject the infinity arguments but still accept 
the traversal argument. The reason is that a temporal infinity is such that it neces-
sarily can be counted off unit by unit in succession because it comes into being in 
that way. Each member of the succession can only be counted off if the preceding 
member has been counted off. 
We see that this is what Philoponus has in mind when we examine some of the Ara-
bic summary of a later treatise in which he presented all his central arguments against 
the pagans in an axiomatic manner. A key part of the summary states the principles 
(axioms) from which he argues. Here is the statement of two of the principles: “The 
first of these principles is that it is impossible for anything which requires to exist in 
order to exist (another) thing to exist, if its (existence) is not preceded by the existence 
of the thing whose existence is required... The third principle is that the existence 
of anything for whose (coming into being) it is requisite that it be preceded by the 
coming into being of an infinite (number of) things that precede (it) is impossible” 
(Pines, 1972:330–331).3 Interpreting the traversal argument in the light of these two 
principles in the Arabic summary, we see that he has an underlying view about time. 
Time comes into existence in units, each of which must come into being before the 
next one can come into being. The traversal metaphor is not crucial to the argument. 
What is crucial is the way in which time comes into being. 
It is at first sight a little puzzling that Philoponus’ does not spell out his view of the 
nature of time in his criticisms of Aristotle. However, if we turn to his commentary 
on Aristotle’s Physics we will see why. He there approvingly presents Aristotle’s view 
2 The Greek word Philoponus uses for “units” is “monades”, literally “singles”. It is usually used to indicate 
quantities of non-zero size. I think that here it means quantities of equal non-zero size. For a very brief 
discussion of the use of the term, see Aristotle, Metaphysics, 1089b:35.
3 Simplicius attributes some very similar premises to Philoponus in discussing another argument against 
Aristotle (Wildberg, 1987:144).
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of time as the view that time flows (Vitelli, 1887:719–727; Broadie, 2011:21–31). Jon 
McGinnis has recently argued that in interpreting Aristotle in this way, Philoponus 
formulates a view about time which is highly original and which profoundly influenced 
interpretations of Aristotle down to very recent times. According to McGinnis, Philo-
ponus formulates this view because he assumes that Plato’s and Aristotle’s theories of 
time are the same (McGinnis, 2003). There has been much recent debate about whether 
Aristotle really believes that time flows. McGinnis argues the Philoponus is original 
because the view that time flows is not to be found in Aristotle though it is implicit in 
Plato’s Timaeus. Whether McGinnis is right or not about Philoponus’ originality and 
influence, he is clearly right about the way in which Philoponus interprets Aristotle. 
Further, the view that time flows fits the phenomenology of time extremely well. So 
presumably that view would have seemed obviously true to Philoponus.
The view that time flows is standardly called the A theory of time. An alternative 
view of time, which is that it is really another dimension laid out eternally just like 
the three spatial dimensions, is standardly called the B theory of time. The distinction 
between the A theory and B theory of time originates with John Ellis McTaggart, who 
thought that the A theory is inconsistent (McTaggart, 1908). In the light of McTaggart’s 
arguments about the A theory and the Minkowski interpretation of Einstein’s Special 
Theory of Relativity, many physicists and philosophers now argue that time does not 
flow (Minkowski, 1952). On this B theory view, our phenomenology is misleading 
as to the nature of time. I will not here discuss the merits of each theory of time. For 
my purposes, it is sufficient to grasp that Philoponus holds the A theory of time and 
that the A theory underlies the traversal argument. Let me turn to reconstructing the 
traversal argument, including Philoponus’ unstated presuppositions, by using modern 
terminology and leaving out the misleading metaphor of traversal.
Reconstructed “Traversal” Argument
 1) The past and the present consist of time units (monades). 
 2) If the A theory of time is true, time has come into existence successively as a 
series of units.
 3) If the A theory of time is true, each unit of time (except a first unit) can only 
come into existence when its predecessor has come into existence before it.
 4) The A theory of time is true.
 5) There cannot exist a present member of an infinite series of units in which each 
member, past and present, could only come into existence after its predecessor 
has come into existence. (“After” is here used in an A theory sense.)
 6) No unit of time can come into existence that has an infinite series of units pre-
ceding it coming into existence in succession before it (inferred from premises 
1 to 5).
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 7) All units preceding a present unit are past units that came into existence in 
succession before it.
 8) A present unit exists.
Thus, 9) there cannot be an infinite number of past units.
Sorabji’s Criticisms 
Let me now explain some of Sorabji’s criticisms and indicate why I think they are 
mistaken.4
Sorabji’s First Criticism
In discussing problems with the traversal argument, Sorabji criticises a possible source 
of resistance to the idea that past time might be infinite. He argues that “[O]ne source 
of resistance may be the idea that if an infinity of days had to pass before the arrival 
of today, then today would never arrive. This would certainly be so, if there were a 
first day, and then an infinity of days to cram in before today. But of course no first 
day is envisaged by those who postulate a beginningless universe, so there is ample 
room for a preceding infinity (Sorabji, 2010b:216).”
It seems from the context of his remark that Sorabji’s intends to criticise what he 
suspects is Philoponus’ underlying assumption in the traversal argument. He suspects 
that the traversal argument is a type 1 argument — that Philoponus is arguing that 
the very postulate of an infinity of time units before today is incoherent because it 
involves the assumption that past time is infinite but began. Sorabji assumes that 
because an infinity of items is logically compatible with there being no first item, that 
Philoponus is making a logical error. However, as we have seen, Philoponus’ argument 
is a type 2 argument. Philoponus is not making a purely logical claim. He relies on the 
assumption that the A theory of time is true and other assumptions. This means that 
Sorabji’s argument is question-begging. In any case, Philoponus is clearly aware that 
an infinite series can have no first member. Indeed, he uses that very point in a further 
argument against an infinite past time. To understand this, let us look at an argument 
in the Arabic paraphrase of Philoponus’ commentary on Aristotle’s Physics 5–8. 
Philoponus there argues that certain infinite series cannot exist because they 
cannot start. The reason is that “[A]n infinite series has no first term, so the series 
of causes of this generation does not have a first term, and as a first term does not 
exist, the following terms do not exist either. On the strength of these assumptions 
simple generation would not exist, and there would be no generation of things. ... As 
an example of this argument one may refute the claim that Socrates has an infinite 
4 Sorabji informs me that he only intended his second criticism to be directed at Philoponus. His criti-
cisms were directed primarily at modern advocates of traversal arguments. However, in his paper, his 
other criticisms are directed at the traversal argument as such.
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number of ancestors, because the infinite has no first term, and when the first one 
does not exist the following ones cannot exist either” (Lettinck, 1994:38). As Lettinck 
points out, the argument is intended to bolster Philoponus’ case that past time can-
not be infinite.5
Let us assume premises 1 to 5 of the reconstructed traversal argument are under-
lying assumptions of the argument in the previous paragraph. Applied to time, the 
argument is saying that an infinite past time is impossible because an infinite series 
of past time units could not have come into existence as it would have no first mem-
ber. The subsequent members of the series could not have come into existence, as 
a pre-condition of their existence is that the preceding members of the series exist 
before they exist. An infinite past time is not consistent with the A theory of time plus 
Philoponus’ additional assumptions. 
The reader should note that if the B theory of time is true, the argument in the 
previous two paragraphs seems not to be a good argument about time. A time series 
laid out eternally might have no first member as the later parts of the time series are 
not ontologically dependent on the earlier parts of it coming into existence first. (Of 
course, each later member of a B series might be ontologically dependent on there 
always being a member that precedes it in the series. However, that would not prevent 
the series from being infinite.) Remember that Philoponus does not think that the 
traversal argument rules out a simultaneously existing infinity. Had he been aware 
of the B theory of time, he might have put his argument as an argument solely about 
A theory time.
Sorabji’s Second Criticism
Consider the following remark by Philoponus: “If then, someone were to say that it 
is possible to take the unlimited (apeiron) in both directions, he says nothing other 
than that an unlimited number can come to be in actuality. For, as one regresses from 
the present year to the previous one, I find that an unlimited number has come to 
pass in actuality.
And yet it is impossible, not only for us, but for nature, to traverse an unlimited 
number; for the unlimited is untraversable by its own nature” (Philoponus, 1994:129–
130). Sorabji’s second criticism seems to be directed against this point even though 
he doesn’t list it in footnotes. Here is Sorabji’s criticism:
5 Lettinck, 1994:11–12. Lettinck seems to misunderstand the argument. He describes it as if it were the 
traversal argument. However, as I understand it, it is a separate argument. It is an argument that there 
cannot be an infinite series of past time units because there is no first member of an infinity and so the 
infinite series could not start (given the A theory of time). Philoponus presents a similar argument in 
his commentary on Aristotle’s On Coming to Be and Perishing. He there also shows a clear awareness 
that infinite series have no first member and says “...it is generally impossible that anything could have 
come to be in the infinity”. In addition, he mentions the impossibility of traversal (Vitelli, 1897:304; 
Kupreeva, 2005:99).
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The first mistaken objection is related to a second one about counting. We might try to 
imagine that the years had already been subjected to counting, as they arrived. If the 
universe had no beginning, then earlier than any year we care to name, the count should 
have already reached infinity. But, the objection goes, it is absurd to suppose that this 
infinite count could be completed. What this objection overlooks is that counting differs 
from traversing in a crucial respect, for counting involves taking a starting number. ... 
But now I must face an objection. If the only obstacle to completing an infinite count is 
that conventional counting takes a starting number, what about counting in a backwards 
direction? Ought it not to be possible for a beginningless being to count off the years 
descending from a higher numbers and finishing with... zero? If this is not possible, then 
how can an infinity of years be possible?
My answer to this is that something like the backwards count would indeed be possible 
in principle ... it is conceptually possible that God should have included a beginningless 
meter in his beginningless universe to record how many years remained until some impor-
tant event, say until the incarnation of his son... At zero BC the meter would register zero, 
but the counting would never have begun. Rather, for every earlier year, the meter would 
have displayed a higher number. Whether or not this should be called counting, there is 
no logical barrier to it, I believe: and therefore no logical barrier has been exhibited to the 
traversal of an infinity of past years. (Sorabji, 2010b:216–217)
“Traversal” may or may not be the right metaphor for what Philoponus wants to 
say. However, Sorabji’s response misses Philoponus’ point. Counting does involve a 
starting number and if Philoponus is right about the nature of time, it is hard to see 
how we can avoid the conclusion that time must have had a starting unit. In that case, 
the units would be countable from the first unit onwards, as Philoponus says. Sorabji’s 
conceptual claim about traversal misses the fact that Philoponus relies on a theory 
about the nature of time. It is thus irrelevant to Philoponus’ argument.
Sorabji’s response to the objection which starts with “[B]ut now I must face an 
objection...” would not work against Philoponus; for what it describes is possible 
only if the B theory of time is true. In any case, the argument is question begging, for 
he assumes that Philoponus is arguing merely logically. Sorabji makes this explicit 
when he says in response to the objection that “no logical barrier has been exhibited 
to the traversal of an infinity of past years”. However, as we have seen Philoponus’ 
argument is not merely logical — it relies on a theory about the nature of time — it 
is a type 2 argument.
Sorabji’s Further Criticism
I will skip discussion of some of Sorabji’s minor criticisms due to lack of space. Sorabji 
argues in a further criticism, directed primarily at modern advocates of the traversal 
argument, that assuming an infinite past does not involve any event an infinite time 
ago. He then comments that “I think that failure to appreciate the nature and extent 
of the disanalogy between past and future series of traversed years has provided one 
motive for the view ... that an infinite past would involve events infinitely far removed 
from the present. Admittedly, a future set of years which started from now would 
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become actually infinite only if, per impossible, it attained to a year that was infinitely 
far removed. But the same ought not to be said about the past.” (Sorabji, 2010b:218).
I have already pointed out that Philoponus is well aware that an infinite past does 
not involve a first event that occurred an infinite time ago. Merely repeating the 
explanation of the nature of an infinite past in response to Philoponus’ supporters is 
begging the question against Philoponus’ type 2 argument. Let me, however, pursue 
Sorabji’s argument further. 
Let me start by pointing out that the claim that there is a disanalogy between the 
past and the future is not correct if the B theory of time is true. If that theory of time is 
true, then, if an infinity of co-present units is possible, an actually infinite future time 
is also possible. Whatever is true of the past is true of the future. Without taking up 
the metaphysics of time, Sorabji is not entitled to make a claim about the disanalogy 
between the past and the future. Despite this problem, Sorabji might be able to rely 
on Philoponus’ own view to criticise him. Philoponus seems to hold that once a time 
unit has come into existence, it is added to time. So perhaps it might be thought that 
Sorabji’s criticism is warranted as an ad hominem criticism. The past is perhaps a 
kind of B series for Philoponus. In response, I do not think that Philoponus’ view is 
correctly described as a B theory of the past. Philoponus at best treats past time units 
as a B series only when they are past. As an A theorist, he thinks that they can only 
become part of the past when they have come into existence. We have seen in earlier 
discussion that they can only come into existence after their predecessors have come 
into existence. So the past cannot have existed eternally if Philoponus is right (see my 
reconstruction of Philoponus’ argument). 
Conclusion
We have seen that Philoponus’ traversal argument crucially relies on a theory about the 
nature of time. As Sorabji does not take account of this, at least three of his criticisms 
of the traversal argument fail. I hope to show elsewhere that his other criticisms of the 
traversal argument fail for similar reasons. Does this mean that time must have had 
a beginning? To deal with this question we would have to discuss the merits of the A 
theory of time and of other assumptions. There is no space for that here. However, 
let me draw a lesson from my discussion. Philosophers often assume that with some 
purely logical or mathematical remarks that they can rebut important metaphysical 
arguments. In fact, as Aristotle pointed out long ago, in using logic or mathematics 
as if it applied to the world without qualification, they often forget that it abstracts 
from important features of the world. Here I want to argue that misleading abstraction 
has led to confusion in discussing whether an infinite past time is possible. Sorabji 
talks about past time as if it has always existed in a Platonic world of the forms that 
renders its specifically temporal features irrelevant. By abstracting from the fact that 
time seems to have come into existence in successive units, he implicitly assumes that 
the B theory of time must have always been true of the past. This is why he thinks 
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that an infinite past time is possible. Yet the B theory of time is not a logical truth. 
To decide whether it is true and whether an infinite past time is possible, we need to 
engage in metaphysical argument.
Bibliography
Broadie, 2011 
S. Broadie, trans. and ed., Philoponus: On Aristotle’s Physics 4.10–14. London: Bristol Clas-
sical Press.
Davidson, 1987 
H. Davidson, Proofs for Eternity, Creation and the Existence of God in Medieval Islamic and 
Jewish Philosophy. New York: Oxford University Press.
Edwards, 1994 
M. Edwards, trans. and ed., Philoponus, On Aristotle’s Physics 3. Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press.
Gregory, 2007 
A. Gregory, Ancient Greek Cosmogony. London: Duckworth.
Kupreeva, 2005 
I. Kupreeva, trans., Philoponus, On Aristotle’s Coming to Be and Perishing 2.5–11. Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press.
Lettinck, 1994 
P. Lettinck, ed. and trans., Philoponus, On Aristotle’s Physics 5–8. Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press.
McGinnis, 2003 
J. McGinnis, “For Every Time there is a Season: John Philoponus on Plato’s and Aristotle’s 
Conception of Time”, Kronoscope 3, 1:83–111.
McTaggart, 1908 
J. McTaggart, “The Unreality of Time”, Mind 17:456–473.
Minkowski, 1952 
H. Minkowski, “Space and Time”. In H. Lorentz et al, The Principle of Relativity. New York: 
Dover. (Originally published in 1908.)
Pines, 1972 
S. Pines, “An Arabic summary of a lost work of John Philoponus”, Israel Oriental Studies 
2:320–352.
Rabe, 1899 
H. Rabe, ed., Ioannes Philoponus: De Aeternitate Mundi contra Proclum. Leipzig: Teubner.
Archived at Flinders University: dspace.flinders.edu.au
GeorGe Couvalis
78
Russell, 1926 
B. Russell, Our Knowledge of the External World (2nd ed.). London: Allen and Unwin.
Share, 2004 
M. Share, trans., Philoponus, Against Proclus, on the Eternity of the World 1–5. London: 
Duckworth.
Sorabji, 1983 
R. Sorabji, Time, Creation and the Continuum. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Sorabji, 2010
R. Sorabji, ed., Philoponus and the Rejection of Aristotelian Science, Second Edition. London, 
Institute of Classical Studies, Supplement 103.
Sorabji, 2010a
R. Sorabji, “John Philoponus”, in Sorabji, 2010:40–81.
Sorabji, 2010b 
R. Sorabji, “Infinity and the Creation”, in Sorabji, 2010:207–220. (Originally published in 
1982.)
Vitelli, 1887 
H. Vitelli, ed., Ioannes Philoponi: In Aristoteles Physicorum, Libros Tres Priores Commentaria. 
Berlin: Georgh Reimer.
Vitelli, 1897
H. Vitelli, ed., Ioannes Philoponi: In Aristoteles De Generatione et Corruptione Commentaria. 
Berlin: Georgh Reimer.
Wildberg, 1987
C. Wildberg, trans. and ed., Philoponus, Against Aristotle, on the Eternity of the World. Lon-
don: Duckworth.
I would like to thank Chris Mortensen and Richard Sorabji for their helpful comments 
on an earlier draft of this paper.
Archived at Flinders University: dspace.flinders.edu.au
